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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigated the current digital authentication methods used by the 
U.S. Navy, reviewed new and alternative methods, and then offered suggestions 
regarding how the Navy could improve the robustness of its digital authentication 
ecosystem. Digital authentication is a critical security control useful for reducing 
operational risks to computer networks. Digital authentication entails any of various 
standards by which an entity (human or machine) can provide corroboration of its 
proclaimed identity in a manner and form that can be processed in a digital environment. 
The suggested authentication methods were ranked according to the strength of security 
and usability within the DoN infrastructure. From this research, a set of tables was 
established to tabulate useful metrics that were identified to determine the strengths and 
weaknesses of each authentication method when compared with the others. This 
facilitated a more granular analysis of the selected authentication methods. Our 
recommendation articulates a four-tier approach based on risk-management principles; 
with Tier 1 being the most secure, yet most costly and least usable, and Tier 4 being the 
least secure, yet least costly and most usable. The four tiers articulated are Tier 
1—CAC-based PKI method, Tier 2—FIDO2-based PKI method, Tier 3—2FA method, 
and Tier 4—password-only method. 
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Digital authentication is a crucial factor for maintaining strong network and computer 
security. The ability to authenticate the identity of the sender/originator is of the utmost 
importance for maintaining the integrity of the Department of the Navy (DoN) networks, and 
the confidence that the information sent and received is not modified or compromised. 
Authentication is needed to ensure integrity, one of the key components of the CIA 
(confidential, integrity, availability) triad, and is paramount and vital to the DoN’s mission. 
Authentication can occur between humans or non-person entities (NPEs). This thesis will use 
the words “it,” “claimant,” and “subscriber,” as dictated by context or source citation, to 
represent the entity being authenticated. Note that the usage of “it” is included, given that 
NPEs are also subject to authentication. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 
800-63-3 series addresses technical requirements for, and guides federal agencies through, the 
correct implementation of digital-based authentication. The NIST SP800-63-3 series, titled 
Digital Identity Guidelines, includes NIST 800-63A: Enrollment and Identity Proofing, and 
NIST 800-63B: Authentication and Life cycle Management. These NIST documents contain 
information that can guide the Navy’s information professionals to choose, implement, and 
configure authentication tools more effectively. 
Threats posed to the U.S. Federal digital authentication ecosystem are constantly 
evolving, thus requiring credential service providers (CSPs) to adapt as necessary. The online 
ecosystem is constantly challenged by attackers. This ecosystem must be as secure as feasible, 
while also being able to support the information operations for which it was designed. 
Modernizing current digital authentication standards is an essential factor for keeping 
up with the provocative nature and mentality of an ever more sophisticated threat. Methods 
of authentication that will be explored are biometric-based and secret-based, with the goal of 
determining the most effective means of providing digital authentication within the DoN. 
This thesis will focus on the Navy’s current policies for digital authentication and how 
it is currently implemented. Moreover, it will attempt to identify institutional practices and 
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standards that can be established to modernize and fortify authentication practices in an effort 
to mitigate dynamic cyber threats. 
The primary research question of this thesis is: what Identity and Access Management 
(IAM) improvements are currently available that could be adopted to improve the overall 
cybersecurity posture of U.S. Navy network enclaves?  Secondary research questions are: 
• What is the current state of digital authentication in the DoN? 
• What are the prominent digital authentication improvements that are either 
not utilized, or are under-utilized, by the DoN? 
• What is the cost/benefit analysis for likely digital authentication 
improvements for the U.S. Navy? 
Any sincere consideration of authentication and the myriad standards devised to 
provide it requires basic understanding of the attendant terminology. As the terminology in 
this domain lacks universal standardization, the ensuing sections of this chapter endeavor to 
establish the terminology to be used in this work. 
A. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (I&A) 
NIST Special Publication 800-53, titled “Security and Privacy Controls for Federal 
Information Systems and Organizations” [1], lists 18 security control families. One of these 
families is Identification and Authentication (IA). The IA family plays a critical role as it 
relates to at least two of the other security control families: access control (AC) and audit and 
accountability (AU).  This is due to the fact that both AC and AU implementations are 
dependent upon the availability of secure IA solutions. According to Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 12 [2], a “secure and reliable form of identification” will have the 
following: 
(a) is issued based on sound criteria for verifying an individual employee’s  
identity; (b) is strongly resistant to identity fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, 
and terrorist exploitation; (c) can be rapidly authenticated electronically; and 
(d) is issued only by providers whose reliability has been established by an 
official accreditation process. [2] 
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1. Identification (Non- I&A Context) 
The term identification is used in two different contexts: one that considers it in 
isolation, and one which considers it as a direct prelude to authentication. We refer to the 
former as the non-I&A context. In the non-I&A context, identification indicates technologies 
developed to identify unknown individuals. A classic case of this is law enforcement agencies 
that attempt to put names on faces that have been captured on still photos or motion video 
feeds. This type of identification is not in scope for this research. 
2. Identification (I&A Context) 
When an identity is freely proffered by an entity seeking to be authenticated, we refer 
to this as identification in the I&A context. In essence, the proffering of an identity is desired 
as it simplifies the authentication task to a 1-to-1 matching problem; as opposed to a many-
to-1 problem which would result if the entity seeking authentication did not claim a specific 
identity at the outset. 
3. Authentication 
According to NIST 800-63-3 [3], authentication is the process employed to validate 
the identity proffered by an entity (whether human or NPE). The publication goes on to state 
that 
Digital authentication is the process of determining the validity of one or more 
authenticators used to claim a digital identity. Authentication establishes that 
a subject attempting to access a digital service is in control of the technologies 
used to authenticate. Successful authentication provides reasonable risk-based 
assurances that the subject accessing the service today is the same as that 
which previously accessed the service [3]. 
Authentication is critical to ensure a requesting entity is authorized to access a specific piece 
of information, thus preventing potential unauthorized disclosures. 
B. FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF AUTHENTICATION 
Though there are many technical variations to how digital authentication can be 
accomplished, the fundamentals are fairly straight-forward. Those fundamentals are discussed 
here, along with two points that provide clarification going forward. 
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1. The Classics (Know, Have, Are) 
There are three classic methods, also known as factors, that can be utilized to 
authenticate:  something known (e.g., password), something possessed (e.g., badge or 
cryptographic key), or some unique physical trait or feature (i.e., biometrics). When an entity 
uses two or more of these classic methods, it is referred to as multi-factor authentication 
(MFA). 
a. Know (Private but Not Secret) 
The classic “know” form of authentication causes some confusion as the term “know” 
is used in two fundamentally different ways. In one way, authentication is performed by 
proving knowledge of private—but not secret—information. This is commonly referred to as 
“knowledge-based authentication.” Since “knowledge” is included in the name of this 
authentication method, it is often conflated with the classic “know” factor which entails 
proving that some secret information is known. 
A classic example where knowledge-based authentication is used, is for persons 
wanting to check their credit scores. When a person requests his score from a credit agency 
(e.g., Equifax), he is presented with several questions related to his—private but not secret—
financial history; such as: “with which of these institutions have you ever obtained a loan?,” 
or “at which of these addresses have you ever lived?” 
According to NIST 800-63A [4], NIST does not recommend knowledge-based 
authentication methods to conduct authentication. This is due to two main issues; the 
attacker’s ability to research answers to knowledge-based questions, and the fact that the 
answers to such questions typically never change and are thus subject to replay attack years 
after they may have been exposed. An example that elicits both of these weaknesses is seen 
in a password recovery question asking, “what was the make and model of your first car?” 
NIST does; however, accept knowledge-based authentication for helping to resolve identities 
during the enrollment process of the identity management life-cycle. Since enrollment is not 
in scope for this research, knowledge-based authentication is not discussed further in this 
work. 
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b. Know (Secret) 
The other way in which the classic “know” form of authentication is performed, is by 
an entity proving knowledge of a secret that has been pre-registered, usually as part of account 
setup, with the authenticating party. Passwords and PINs are the most common examples of 
the “know” factor of authentication. This usage of “know” as a form of authentication is 
within the scope of this research. 
c. Have 
This form of authentication is commonly referred to as “something you have,” and 
requires the entity requesting authentication to be in custody of some object (e.g. RSA token 
or smart card). This will ultimately be used for proof of possession of a secret. 
d. Are 
Commonly referred to as a “something you are” form of authentication, biometrics 
can be used as a method to authenticate. Biometric methods are comprised of both physical 
and behavioral characteristics. Examples of physical biometric characteristics are fingerprints 
and facial features/geometry; whereas keyboard typing metrics is an example of a behavioral 
characteristic. 
2. The Classics Reconsidered 
In the opinion of Fulp [5] the classics—know, have, are—can be categorized in a less 
confusing way. Fulp offers that all three of these classic factors are ultimately “have” 
requirements. The entity wishing to be authenticated must either: have the password (a secret), 
have the hardware token capable of generating a secret, or have a particular biometric trait, 
feature, or characteristic. With all three factors, the entity is ultimately being authenticated by 
proving he/she/it is in possession of some pre-registered secret or biometric. Using this 
simplified view, then, all authentication methods—barring those that are “knowledge-based” 




The NIST 800-63B precludes the use of biometrics as a singular method for 
authentication because “the False Match Rate (FMR) does not provide confidence in the 
authentication of the claimant by itself. In addition, FMR does not account for spoofing 
attacks. Biometric comparison is probabilistic, whereas the other authentication factors are 
deterministic” [6]. Despite these issues, biometrics is often used in conjunction with proving 
possession of secrets, resulting in strong MFA implementations [6]. 
b. Secret 
Secret-based methods entail the entity proving he/she/it possesses either a symmetric 
secret (e.g., key, PIN, password, etc.) that is shared by the authenticating party, or an 
asymmetric secret (e.g., private key) that corresponds to a certified public key that is available 
to the authenticating party. 
An example implementation of secret-based authentication is by way of an out-of-
band (OOB) device. According to NIST 800-63B [6], an OOB device is a “physical device 
that is uniquely addressable and can communicate securely with the verifier over a distinct 
communications channel, referred to as the secondary channel” [6]. One example of an OOB 
device implementation of secret-based authentication is for the verifier to send a temporary 
(secret) PIN to the claimant’s pre-registered telephone number or e-mail. Another example is 
to utilize applications on a mobile device to scan a barcode or Quick Response (QR) code sent 
by the verifier. The claimant authenticates by proving possession of the sent PIN or QR code 
back to the verifier [6]. 
C. TERMINOLOGY 
Given the importance of a standardized lexicon for efficient discourse within any 
complex domain of study, we present nine terms that are essential for understanding and 
communicating issues of digital authentication. The descriptions below also align with the 
NIST 800-63-3. It is important to note; however, that digital technologies, including 
authentication, continue to evolve, which may result in their attendant terms being used 
inconsistently among the user/developer population. 
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1. Registration/Enrollment 
The process used to verify, or establish, the identity of a person when she is being 
initially entered into a digital authentication system is called registration or enrollment. For 
example, Alice Jones is hired by the Acme consulting firm. During enrollment Alice provides 
proof of her name (verify), and then is given a unique identity (establish) that is unique within 
the Acme domain, such as akjones@acme.org. This process enters Alice into the identity 
management life-cycle at Acme. Part of this process will also entail Acme establishing secrets, 
and possibly biometrics, to be used for authenticating Alice [3]. 
2. Identity 
A unique name/label determined by a CSP to describe the claimant for a frame of 
reference; for example, akjones as the unique username for Alice Jones within the Acme 
consulting firm. 
3. Credential 
A credential is “an object or data structure that authoritatively binds an identity - via 
an identifier or identifiers to at least one authenticator possessed and controlled by a claimant” 
[3]. For example, Alice’s digital certificate containing the public key that corresponds with 
the authenticator private key (e.g. CertAlice). 
4. Claimant 
The entity being authenticated. The term claimant is used as it conveys the notion that 
an entity is merely “claiming” a particular identity; the ‘I’ of “I&A,” but must undergo 
authentication in order to prove it. Use of this term to describe an entity implies that the entity 
has already completed registration/enrollment within the domain/system in which the 
authentication is being conducted. 
5. Relying Party (RP) 
The relying party is the entity that has a security-related interest in the truthfulness of 
a claimant’s declaration of a particular identity; typically for the purposes of access control or 
audit and accountability. 
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6. Authenticator 
The term authenticator is used to represent whatever is being presented by the claimant 
to satisfy the authentication criteria utilized by the verifier; for example, a password. The term 
“token” was used in previous versions of the SP800-63-3, but this has since been changed to 
the term “authenticator,” which will be the term used throughout this thesis. 
7. Authentication 
The process employed to verify the identity of a claimant by an entity (whether human 
or NPE). 
8. Verifier 
The entity performing the authentication. Note this role may coincide with that of the 
RP if it is the RP that is performing the authentication. When the roles of RP and verifier are 
separate, then the verifier performs the authentication on behalf of the RP. As a simple 
example, the DMV (verifier) verifies identities and “certifies” them, along with a date of birth 
attribute, via a driver license (credential). A bar owner (RP) then relies upon driver licenses 
to avoid the risk of losing his liquor licenses by selling to minors. 
9. Token 
A digital object presented to a claimant by a verifier that serves as proof verifiable by 
a 3rd party RP that the claimant has been authenticated by the verifier. In this context the token 
is a unique string of characters bound to a claimant, and proves to the RP that the claimant is 
who it says it is. Unlike a key exchange infrastructure, a claimant will not share the token 
bound to them with another claimant. Note that this term can be confused with the term 
credential, as they are often used to represent similar digital objects. For example, the driver 
license scenario described in the previous paragraph—the license could be referred to as either 
a token or a credential. 
D. REFERENCE MODEL 
Here we present a hypothetical reference model to illustrate the typical contextual 
usage of the terms introduced above. The model is simplistic so as to enhance clarity of the 
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terms, and does not introduce or explain implementation details of any particular 
authentication system or standard. 
1. Registration/Enrollment 
Upon joining the Navy, Bob is required to provide several documents to prove his 
identity (e.g., birth certificate and driver’s license). Once the Navy is satisfied with this initial 
identity confirmation, they enter Bob into their personnel database and issue him a digital 
certificate. 
2. Identity 
In Bob’s digital certificate, his unique (within the Navy) identity is established as 
Bob#.Navy; where # represents a number sufficient to make this Bob unique among all other 
Bob’s in the Navy. Bob’s regular name, “Bob,” is retained as an attribute of his entire digital 
personnel record (i.e., part of Bob’s persona), but his digital authentication transactions 
require usage of his  unique Bob#.Navy identity. 
3. Credential 
This is the digital certificate created for Bob during enrollment. This credential 
associates the identity Bob#.Navy with a particular public key; a public key for which Bob 
was given the corresponding private key for his safe-keeping. 
4. Claimant 
In the execution of Bob’s duties, he needs to access a secure Navy website. When Bob 
connects to the website, he is claiming to be the entity associated with the identity Bob#.Navy; 
that is, Bob is acting in role of a claimant in the I&A context. 
5. Relying Party (RP) 
The Navy website is charged with securing resources by way of access controls that 
are implemented via permissions associated with each user identity. Thus, the website is 
reliant upon the verification of Bob’s claimed identity in order to affect its access control-
based security policy. 
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6. Authenticator 
The website sends Bob a challenge (random string of symbols), which he encrypts 
with the private key (an example of an authenticator) that is associated with the public key in 
his digital certificate (the credential). 
7. Authentication 
Bob sends the encrypted challenge back to the website. The website, acting as both 
the verifier and the RP, will decrypt the encrypted challenge to ensure the decrypted result 
matches what was originally sent to Bob. In the case of a match, Bob is authenticated and 
provided website access according his permissions; else Bob’s request is rejected. 
8. Verifier 
Since the website conducted the authentication process, it was not only the RP, but 
also the verifier in this example. 
9. Token 
To explain the term token, the scenario must be changed slightly, in that the RP 
(website) is not also the verifier. Instead, the verifier is some other system, device, or 
organization. With this change in mind, authentication proceeds as follows. Bob contacts the 
website with his claim to be Bob#.Navy. The RP website forwards this claim to a designated 
verifier which conducts the same challenge-response protocol described above. If the 
authentication is successful, the verifier creates a token that attests to the identity verification. 
This token is itself authenticatable via some mechanism, for example being digitally signed 
by the verifier. At this point, one of two things can happen: 1) the verifier sends the token 
directly to the RP, or 2) the verifier sends the token to the claimant, who would then be 
expected to send it to the RP, but as was mentioned Chapter I.C.9, there will be no sharing of 
a token between claimants. 
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II. AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM MAJOR CONCERNS 
Traditional methods for the authentication of users is an increasing cause for 
concern and has amplified issues requiring attention from the DOD. The current 
authentication ecosystem provides reasonable options to secure networks. However, as 
cyber actors evolve in their approach, it becomes necessary for the DOD to modernize its 
methods of authentication. 
This chapter will highlight the guidelines in place to construct a more secure 
authentication environment than what is currently in-place, discuss security levels required 
and corresponding authenticator types for each, and the overall usability for approved 
authentication methods. 
A. CURRENTLY DEFINED U.S. FEDERAL DIGITAL AUTHENTICATION 
ECOSYSTEM 
The U.S. Federal Government digital authentication ecosystem is governed by 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HPSD)-12, which states that the Department of 
Commerce will establish a standard for the Federal Government to implement secure and 
reliable forms of identification. Part 3 of this document states that secure and reliable 
identification “can be rapidly authenticated electronically” [2]. NIST, which is part of the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, issued the special publication (SP) series 800-63 regarding 
digital identity. The SP 800-63 series sets the standard for the Federal Government to 
conduct digital authentication. The following documents are included in the 800-63 series: 
• NIST SP 800-63-3: Digital Identify Guidelines 
• NIST SP 800-63A: Digital Identity Guidelines—Enrollment and Identity 
Proofing 
• NIST SP 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines—Authentication and Life 
cycle Management. 
Furthermore, the Department of Defense (DOD) has its own directives, which stem from 
these NIST publications. DOD Instruction (DODI) 8520.03 is the DOD’s instruction for 
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“Identity Authentication for Information Systems” [7], while DODI 8500.01E is for 
“Cybersecurity” [8]. These DOD documents are discussed further in Chapter III of this 
thesis. 
B. AUTHENTICATOR ASSURANCE/VERIFIER REQUIREMENTS 
A claimant is required to use a protected channel when authenticating itself. This 
ensures the confidentiality of the authenticator used and aids in preventing a Man in the 
Middle (MitM) attack. The NIST guidance also requires that verifiers have “hardware 
cryptographic modules validated at a specific FIPS 140 level” [6]. Federal Information 
Processing Standard (FIPS) 140 defines four security levels for cryptographic modules, 
with Level 1 being the lowest and Level 4 being the highest. 
The FIPS 140-2 [9], “specifies the security requirements that will be satisfied by a 
cryptographic module utilized within a security system.”  The requirements for these 4 
levels cover a wide range of technical specifications. “The Cryptographic Module 
Validation Program (CMVP) validates cryptographic modules to FIPS 140-2 and other 
cryptography based standards” [9]. Once CMVP has validated a product, it can be 
implemented by Federal agencies for the protection of sensitive information [9]. 
At Security Level 1, there is no requirement for physical security mechanisms, and 
“basic security requirements are specified for a cryptographic module (e.g., at least one 
Approved algorithm or Approved security function shall be used)” [9]. At Security Level 
2, physical security is enhanced by “adding the requirement for tamper-evidence” [9]. At 
this level, role-based authentication is required “in which a cryptographic module 
authenticates the authorization of [the claimant] to assume a specific role and perform a 
corresponding set of services” [9]. Security Level 3 adds more physical protection by 
adding mechanisms that will detect and respond to physical access or the modification of 
the module [9]. Moreover, it “requires identity-based authentication mechanisms, 
enhancing the security provided by the role-based authentication mechanisms specified for 
Security Level 2” [9]. The highest level of security is Security Level 4. At this level, the 
physical security provides a complete “envelope” of protection, given “penetration of the 
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cryptographic module enclosure from any direction has a very high probability of being 
detected” [9]. 
This thesis will use the term verification or verifier as is described in Chapter I.C.8 
as the entity performing the authentication. The word validate or validation will be used to 
describe the “process of demonstrating that the system under consideration meets in all 
respects the specification of that system” [10].1 
The NIST SP800-63B describes three authenticator assurance levels (AAL) from 
AAL1 to AAL3. AAL1 is the least secure, while AAL3 is the most secure. When personally 
identifiable information (PII) or personal information that characterizes the information for 
which authentication is required, the NIST SP800-63B requires AAL2 at a minimum. 
The NIST manual states that AAL1 will provide “some assurance that the claimant 
controls an authenticator bound to the subscriber’s account.”  This authentication level can 
be either single or multi-factor. To successfully authenticate itself, the claimant must 
“prove possession and control of the authenticator through a secure authentication 
protocol” [6]. The NIST publication states AAL1 requires a FIPS 140 Level 1 for 
Government agency verifiers. 
According to NIST 800-63B [6], AAL2 provides the claimant with higher 
confidence than AAL1 that the claimant controls the authenticator that is attached to the 
claimant’s account. The NIST publication states that AAL2 requires a FIPS 140 Level 1 
for Government agency authenticators and verifiers. This is more secure than AAL1, 
because unlike AAL1 which requires a FIPS 140 Level 1 for only the verifier, AAL2 also 
requires the authenticator to be FIPS 140 Level 1. 
AAL3 is the highest level of authenticator assurance levels listed in the NIST 
SP800-63B. This level “provides very high confidence that the claimant controls 
authenticator(s) bound to the subscriber’s account” [6]. According to NIST 800-63B [6], 
this is implemented by requiring the proof of possession of a key (secret) and a 
                                                 
1 The authors of this thesis believe the word “verification” in Table 4-1 in NIST SP 800-63B should be 
“validation.” 
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cryptographic protocol. At this level, a hardware-based authenticator will be used. The 
NIST publication states that AAL3 requires a FIPS 140 Level 2 for MFA, while the less 
secure FIPS 140 Level 1 is allowed for single-factor cryptographic devices and verifiers. 
And regardless of those factor considerations, the publication specifies a minimum of FIPS 
Level 3 for the physical security requirements of all authenticators at AAL3. FIPS Level 3 
for physical security requires “automatic zeroization when accessing the maintenance 
access interface [and] Tamper response and zeroization circuitry [and] Protected vents” 
[9]. 
C. PERMITTED AUTHENTICATOR TYPES 
Table 1 is a representation of the permitted authenticator types, FIPS 140 
requirements, and reauthentication requirements for each AAL level. 




It is crucial for a claimant to reauthenticate a session after a given period of time. 
This reauthentication time is the amount of time before a claimant will need to authenticate 
again. The maximum reauthentication interval for AAL1 is 30 days, and  any authenticator 
can be used to reauthenticate. The maximum reauthentication interval for AAL2 is 12 hours 
of activity or 30 minutes of inactivity, and the claimant needs to present either a 
“memorized secret or biometric” authenticator to reauthenticate. The maximum 
reauthentication interval for AAL3 is 12 hours of activity or 15 minutes of inactivity, and  
MFA authentication methods are required to reauthenticate [6]. 
E. AUTHENTICATION RISKS 
According to Todorov [11], attackers will attempt to penetrate devices and 
networks that require authentication. There are many ways an attacker can attempt to gain 
access to a system, including attempts to bypass the authentication process entirely. For 
example, if the attacker has physical access then the attacker may be able elevate privileges. 
Once the attacker escalates privileges, he or she can find the application that requires 
authentication and modify it to accept the attacker’s username and password. This is more 
difficult to conduct on servers, given that servers typically have limited physical access. 
However, an attacker can attempt to bypass authentication protocols on a server by trying 
to guess a URL that is logically “behind” the login screen on a website [11]. Additionally, 
if the attacker has physical access, he or she may be able to access information without 
performing the intended authentication requirement, by bypassing the local authentication 
measures that were imposed by the operating system [11]. Attackers could also “shoulder 
surf” and attempt to observe a claimant entering his or her authenticator (e.g., password) 
into the system. 
Many software and hardware vendors use default passwords on their equipment. If 
an attacker is able to determine the hardware or software being utilized in the authentication 
process, the attacker can use these default passwords to observe whether the passwords 
were changed after being installed [11]. 
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When a claimant attempts to authenticate itself using authenticators, the 
authentication request is performed by processes that are running on behalf of the user, 
which may have escalated privileges [11]. This lends itself to attackers who can find a 
security hole. If the attacker is able to find the security issue, it may be possible to conduct 
a stack overflow attack. Successfully doing so may force an application to execute code of 
the attacker’s choosing, and to do so with the more elevated privileges of the user who—
as is often the case—is running the overflowed process in a privileged mode (i.e., system 
administrator) [11]. 
An attacker can also guess the username and password by conducting 
reconnaissance. For example, an attacker can look at the organization’s email addresses 
and observe that all e-mails are first name (.) last name followed by the organization. The 
attacker can guess that the username is going to be the same format as the beginning of the 
e-mail address. An attacker can also attempt to use brute-force techniques through a 
password cracking application that will cycle through potential passwords that are 
combinations of dictionary words and characters. 
Rainbow tables (RT) can be used to expedite password discovery when only the 
hash of the password is known to the attacker. Since RTs capture a great deal of pre-hash 
work for a given password space (alphabet and length specific), they allow the discovery 
of password collisions much more quickly than would be possible if the attacker was 
relegated to finding a collision via brute-force, with no previous hash work having been 
processed and stored. A simplistic example is offered here. Assume Bob’s password is 
“apple” and the attacker observes the hash of Bob’s password (assume the hash is 
“b5d68a3q”). The attacker enters the appropriate RT with “b5d68a3q” and a collision is 
found (assume it is “banana”). This (hypothetical example) assumes the “apple” and 
“banana” both hash to the same hash value (i.e., they collide) given the hash function being 
employed. Under these circumstances, the attacker may use “banana”—though not Bob’s 
password—to authenticate as Bob. Further discussion of RTs is outside the scope of this 
research. 
Attackers can also replay authenticators (directly) or data (e.g., packet payloads)  
that contain the processed output of a previously generated authentication reply. As an 
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example, when static authentication is used, an attacker could replay the password. This 
requires the attacker to be able to observe the traffic between claimant and server. If the 
claimant sends an encrypted text to authenticate, the attacker can present the captured 
encrypted text to the server to authenticate itself. To avoid these replay attacks, many 
authentication techniques involve a challenge-response mechanism. With such a 
mechanism, 
the authenticator will generate a random string and will present it as a 
challenge to the [claimant]. The [claimant] will typically manipulate the 
server challenge in some way and will typically encrypt it using the user 
password or a derivative as the key, or generate a hash based on the 
challenge and the user password  [11]. 
Another threat to authentication is the ability for attackers to downgrade 
authentication strength. In this scenario, an attacker acting as a MitM, modifies the traffic 
between claimant and server to a weaker authentication protocol or mode. As a result, this 
could possibly display the plaintext password or other usable authenticators that the 
attacker could harvest [11]. 
The last threat to authentication entails social engineering, wherein the attacker 
convinces the claimant to reveal their authenticators through an e-mail or telephone 
inquiry. An example of this technique is when the attacker deceives the claimant, thereby 
causing the claimant to either pass its authenticators to a false website or provide its 
authenticators via a phone call [6]. 
F. USABILITY 
Usability is a significant consideration in authentication standards. The NIST SP 
800-63B states that the goal of usability is to be able to access information as intended [6]. 
An organization cannot make it so difficult to access information that claimants are unable 
to access the information in a timely manner. For example, if the log on process takes too 
much time, this will reduce the effectiveness of the entire authentication ecosystem. NIST 
recommends conducting an evaluation of usability to ensure the usability is appropriate 
and does not result in claimants attempting to develop workarounds that will ultimately 
reduce the value of the authentication methods and procedures [6]. 
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NIST recommends specific usability considerations for each of the different 
authenticator types. These are summarized in tabular form in Table 2. For a memorized 
secret, the more difficult the requirements are, the more likely a claimant will not be able 
to recall the password. Authentication should allow a cut and paste functionality for 
memorized secrets “this facilitates the use of password managers, which are widely used 
and in many cases increase the likelihood that users will choose stronger memorized 
secrets” [6]. When using look-up secrets the authenticator should consider the length and 
complexity of the secret. The longer and more complex it is, the more difficult it will be to 
input. Out-of-band usability should take into account that the claimant will have to go back 
and forth between screens; for example, on both a smart phone and computer. It is also 
recommended that an out-of-band device should have to be unlocked before the claimant 
is able to view the secret. For multi-factor OTP devices, NIST recommends that there is a 
reasonable grace period for the claimant to enter the OTP before it expires. Single-factor 
and multi-factor cryptographic software should present recognizable terminology and 
names to claimants, so as to more clearly convey which cryptographic key is expected. 
Security personnel involved in choosing appropriate authentication implementations 
should be aware that for single-factor and multi-factor cryptographic devices, a single 
physical input could be an issue because plugging a device into a USB port that is located 
on the back of a computer, or using a laptop with limited USB ports, could affect the 
usability of the device. Table 2 summarizes the considerations NIST recommends for 
usability for various authenticator types. 
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III. CURRENT U.S. NAVY DIGITAL AUTHENTICATION 
POLICY AND PRACTICES 
In this chapter, we present current policies and practices that both inform and 
guide the U.S. Navy in its pursuit to implement and leverage modern technologies. In 
today’s digital environment, the amount and sensitive nature of the information that DoN 
users are storing and sharing requires increased security. The DOD policy mandates that 
the DoN implement requirements set forth in DOD Instruction 8500.01, which “assigns 
responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for implementing identity authentication of 
all entities to DOD information systems” [7]. 
A. POLICY 
Due to an increase in threats against the DOD’s networks and critical information 
systems, it was mandated that “commanders and supervisors at all levels, including the 
operational level, to lead engagements in improving cybersecurity readiness across the 
force” [12]. Based on recent reporting and lessons learned of  network compromises, 
there was evidence of systemic shortfalls in the implementation of basic cybersecurity 
requirements policies, directives, and orders department-wide [12]. 
Information stored on DOD systems is accessed and shared by a large number of 
users, and the data must be secured such that claimants are only allowed to access 
information for which they have a mission-related need to know. Further, it is important 
to audit the actions of authorized users so as to ensure their compliance with an 
organization’s security policies. Both of these issues, access-control and audit, are 
supported by a requisite I&A policy and its attendant processes and procedures. 
The sections that follow describe the current authentication methods being 
leveraged by the DoN and how they are being implemented. Of main concern to the 
DoN are: 1) the Personal Identity Verification (PIV) program, 2) the DOD Certificate 
Policy, 3) the DOD-issued Common Access Card, and 4) the Public Key Infrastructure. 
Since the most effective intrusions take advantage of known vulnerabilities, all 
personnel must understand the roles necessary to maintain a robust defensive posture. 
22 
1. PIV—Authentication 
Per HSPD-12, PIV authentication is required, “in order to establish more uniform 
standards for issuing government identity credentials” [2]. PIV authentication applies to 
all government personnel, government contractors, and government-controlled 
facilities. Its usage facilitates authorization-based access control to claimants, 
subsequent to a smart card-based authentication. The standard set forth by the FIPS 201-
2, outlines the architecture and technical requirements to support smart card-based 
authentication. 
PIV should be used for: 
• All authentication for all privileged users including servers, networks, 
and applications; 
• All network authentication for all users; 
• All application authentication for all users of an application that 
protects or contains sensitive information; and 
• Physical access to facilities and buildings. [13] 
PIV credentials are made up of digital certificates, key pairs, a unique pin, and 
in some cases biometrics. When combined into a single credential, they can provide the 
capability to leverage MFA for DoN networks and applications [13]. 
An operationally functional PIV system is made up of three main components; 
the PIV Front-End Subsystem, the PIV Card Issuance and Management Subsystem, and 
the PIV Relying Subsystem. FIPS 201-2 further explains what each subsystem is 
responsible for: 
PIV Front-End Subsystem: PIV Card, card and biometric readers, and 
PIN input device. The PIV cardholder interacts with these components to 
gain physical or logical access to the desired Federal resource. 
PIV Card Issuance and Management Subsystem: the components 
responsible for identity proofing and registration, card and key issuance 
and management, and the various repositories and services (e.g., public 
key infrastructure (PKI) directory, certificate status servers) required as 
part of the verification infrastructure. 
PIV Relying Subsystem: the physical and logical access control systems, 
the protected resources, and the authorization data. [10] 
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2. DOD Certificate Policy 
The United States DOD X.509 Certificate Policy (CP) lays out the current DOD 
CP. The introduction states that: 
programs that carry out or support the mission of the DOD require 
services such as authentication, confidentiality, technical non-
repudiation, and access control. These services are met with an array of 
network security components such as workstations, guards, firewalls, 
routers, in-line network encryptors [sic], and trusted database servers. 
[14] 
The CP further states that, “the use of public key certificates will not add any security 
services in a poorly designed system.” DOD Instruction 8520.02 further states that it is 
DOD policy that: 
• The DOD shall implement a DOD-wide PKI to maintain the certificate 
life cycle, including, but not limited to, issuance, suspension, and 
revocation. The DOD shall issue certificates to DOD PKI Certificate 
Eligible Users in accordance with United States Department of 
Defense X.509 Certificate Policy. The DOD PKI also shall support 
requirements for group, role, information systems, device, and code 
signing certificates. The DOD PKI shall provide first and third-party 
key recovery for private keys associated with encryption certificates. 
• The DOD shall only rely on certificates that are issued by the DOD 
PKI or by a DOD approved PKI for authentication, digital signature, 
or encryption. DOD mission partners shall use certificates issued by 
the DOD External Certification Authority (ECA) program or a DOD 
approved PKI, when interacting with the DOD in unclassified 
domains. 
• The DOD shall establish and maintain a cross certification with the 
Federal PKI to comply with FIPS 201-1. The DOD shall facilitate the 
issuance of any new PKI certificates necessary to comply with Federal 
or Office of Management and Budget issuances or mandates and be 
consistent with DOD implementation plans. DOD PKI shall comply 
with FIPS 201-1for mandatory certificates issued on the CAC. 
• PKIs operating under the purview of the DOD are approved for use for 
their intended purpose and environment. 
• The effective implementation of the CP will depend on the reliability 
of the cryptographic keys, reliable management of the current 
infrastructure, and procedural implementation by personnel 
overseeing the operation. [15] 
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3. CAC 
The CAC is a smart card that satisfies MFA and is used to ID U.S. military, DOD 
civilians, and vetted contractors. It is approximately the size of a credit card and can 
store 144K of data on an integrated circuit chip. The CAC contains specific, 
“abbreviated data relating to your work functions or benefits and privileges provided as 
a uniformed member of the Armed Forces, U.S. Public Health Service, or NOAA, DOD 
Civilian, or DOD Contractor” [16], and a digital image of the cardholder’s face, 
fingerprints, PII, and the PKI certificates associated with the user. In January of 2011, 
the Social Security Number was removed from the CAC and replaced with the DOD 
identification number. Figure 1 visually maps the physical characteristics of a DOD 
issued CAC. 
 
Figure 1. DOD CAC Topology. Source: [17]. 
When the CAC is inserted into a reader and the enabling PIN is entered, the 
reader will invoke middleware protocols to authenticate the claimant and grant or deny 
access. For continued resource access, the CAC must remain inserted. The user then 
removes the card at the termination of his/her session. 
The CAC allows personnel logical access to DOD networks and, in some cases, 
physical access to government facilities. The CAC makes use of PKI certificates to 
authenticate the identity of the cardholder, and allows the claimant to encrypt and 
cryptographically sign emails and other data. 
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Smart card technology underpins the physical platform upon which PIV and 
CAC/PKI functionality rely upon. A smart card is a credit card-sized platform that 
according to DODI 8520.03 [7], is made up of multiple integrated circuits and can use 
one or a combination of the following technologies: 
• magnetic stripe 
• bar code (linear or two dimensional) 
• non-contact and radio frequency transmitters 
• integrated circuit chip 
• biometric information 
• encryption and authentication information 
• photo identification. [7] 
The current DOD CAC is a smart card and offers strong authentication by 
achieving AAL3 [6]. This is based on the information provided in Chapter II.B, that 
describes the different levels of authentication (AAL1 through AAL3). Cryptographic 
keys and other restricted authentication details are kept on the card and remain protected, 
“physically and logically,” making it difficult to compromise. The DOD CAC meets the 
DOD’s requisite authentication standards, and can produce, save, and use asymmetric 
encryption keys (i.e., Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and/or Elliptic-Curve 
Cryptography (ECC)) [18]. According to Double Octopus [18], a smart card is used to 
execute cryptographic algorithms through a microprocessor. Smart cards are connected 
to a host computer, and software on the host computer interacts with the cryptographic 
processing onboard the card to authenticate the claimant (card owner) during any of 
various smart card-enabled authentication transactions  [18]. However, smart card 
implementation can be costly due to such issues as software installation, the requirement 
to obtain compatible card readers, and the need for a physical card. 
PKI is made up of a “framework and services that provide for the generation, 
production, distribution, control, accounting, and destruction of public key certificates” 
[15]. A Certification Authority (CA) acts as a trusted intermediary, issuing certificates 
and keys to confirm the identities of claimants exchanging information. Figure 2 
illustrates the request and use of a public key. 
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Figure 2. PKI Key Exchange. Source: [19]. 
Utilizing asymmetric cryptography methods, PKI employs software and 
encryption technologies to associate a unique digital signature to a specific claimant. 
This signature is included inside of the digital certificate that contains the owning 
claimant’s public key. In this way, a claimant’s public key is cryptographically bound 
to the registered claimant. This technology is designed to make “counterfeiting” (i.e., 
attacker impersonates a claimant) very difficult to achieve. Assuming then that the 
claimant’s private key remains (by policy and design) only in the claimant’s possession, 
then the stage is set for asymmetric-based digital authentication as follows. First, the 
user (now acting in the role of claimant) declares its identity to the verifier. Second, the 
verifier sends a random challenge to the claimant. Third, the claimant encrypts the 
challenge with its private key, and returns it to the verifier along with the claimant’s 
digital certificate. Last, the verifier authenticates the claimant by ensuring that the 
certified public key in the certificate can correctly decrypt the encrypted challenge. 
As described in NIST SP 800-32 [20], PKI allows entities to electronically 
exchange digital information with the confidence that: 
• The person or process identified as sending the transaction is actually 
the originator. 
• The person or process receiving the transaction is the intended 
recipient. 
• Data integrity has not been compromised. [20] 
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B. NAVY-WIDE IMPLEMENTATION 
The DoN policy for implementation of services related to identification and 
authentication is outlined in “DOD Instruction 8520.03, Identity Authentication for 
Information Services.” The introduction from this document provides that: 
identity authentication for information systems and networks within the 
DOD must be conducted in a manner that provides confidentiality by 
mitigating against unauthorized access; provides integrity that protects 
against unintentional or malicious change; and provides availability of 
data for all DOD mission partners and users. [7] 
It goes on to mention that in order “to perform proper authentication, information system 
owners must use identity authentication procedures that consider the importance and 
sensitivity of the information in a system, and recognize the threats and vulnerabilities to 
the system” [7]. The DoN uses PIV and CAC/PKI to authenticate claimants; these are 
described in the following paragraphs. 
PIV—Per FIPS 201-2, lays out the implementation requirements for the use of 
PIV cards, and asserts that cards “must be personalized with identity information for the 
individual to whom the card is issued, in order to perform identity verification both by 
humans and automated systems” [10]. 
CAC—Per DOD Directive 5144.02, DOD Instruction 8520.03 implements “use 
of the DOD Common Access Card, which is the DOD personal identity verification 
credential, into identity authentication processes in DOD information systems where 
appropriate” [7]. 
PKI Certificate Policy—Per DOD Directive 5144.1, DOD Instruction 8520.02 
lays out instructions to “establish and implement policy, assign responsibilities, and 
prescribe procedures for developing and implementing a DOD-wide PKI and enhancing 
the security of DOD information systems by enabling these systems to use PKI for 
authentication, digital signatures, and encryption” [15]. 
The objectives of this research, was to: 1) establish foundational principles of 
digital-based identification and authentication (I&A), 2) summarize existing related 
technologies, 3) summarize applicable DoN policy, 4) explore nascent I&A technologies 
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and initiatives, then 5) proffer recommendations for improving existing DoN I&A 
implementations based upon our observations. The preceding chapters have delivered 
items 1-3. Chapters IV and V will address items 4 and 5, respectively. 
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IV. MODERN/IMPROVED DIGITAL AUTHENTICATION 
METHODS 
Within the past decade, security companies have been working to eliminate the 
practice of using passwords during the authentication process in order to move to a more 
secure infrastructure: specifically, a passwordless authentication ecosystem. According to 
the Fast Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance, over 80% of data breaches are attributed to 
cracked passwords [21]. As was discussed in Chapter II, passwords are an inherent 
vulnerability given that users tend to either reuse passwords, create variations of them, or 
create weak passwords for ease of remembrance. We note that although many of the 
authors referenced throughout this chapter use the term “credential” for the secrets used to 
conduct proof-of-possession of a secret-based authentication, we continue our usage of the 
NIST-preferred term: “authenticator” to avoid confusion. 
A. AUTHENTICATION STANDARDS 
With the development of newer and more technologically advanced authentication 
standards, new requirements are being levied on organizations to increase the strength of 
their authentication methods. The FIDO Alliance, in concert with the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C), is collaborating on technologies that are interoperable with popular 
software, and leverage hardware already in use by the DOD. In “Authentication in the Age 
of GDPR” [22], the author explains that the evolving authentication ecosystem, which 
incorporates third-party validation, exists for the purpose of decreasing vulnerabilities and 
costs for execution throughout the DOD [22]. 
The sections that follow will explore the following authentication standards and 
technologies: FIDO, OAUTH 2.0/OPENID CONNECT (OIDC), and CAC. 
1. FIDO Alliance 
The FIDO Alliance states it is an “open industry association with the focused 
mission; authentication standards to help reduce the worlds’ over reliance on passwords”  
[23]. This alliance is comprised of multiple large organizations that are stakeholders in the 
securing of e-commerce, to include: Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, RSA, Yubico, 
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Wells Fargo, and NIST. In “Universal Second Factor Overview” [24], the FIDO Alliance 
describes their mission is to develop more secure online authentication standards by 
creating technical requirements, pursuing worldwide distribution, and certifying the 
underlying FIDO protocols to a global standard. According to the FIDO Alliance, their 
core efforts are: “1) ease of use, 2) privacy and security, and 3) standardization” [24]. FIDO 
standards were designed to protect privacy. “The protocols do not provide information that 
can be used by different online services to collaborate and track a user across the services” 
[25]. However, FIDO infrastructure provides options for “binding” a FIDO2 authenticator 
with an identity. 
The next three sections will address the three different FIDO standards, all of which 
use public key cryptography. The first two, Client to Authenticator Protocols (CTAP) 1 
and 2, utilize various technologies, to include: near field communications (NFC), Bluetooth 
Low Energy (BLE), software, or secured cryptographic capabilities [24]. In many of the 
suggested implementations of these technologies, the preferred platform for performing the 
underlying protocols are Universal Serial Bus (USB) devices. In contrast, the third 
standard, FIDO Universal Authentication Framework (UAF), relies on devices such as 
mobile phones or tablets. All three FIDO standards require that the claimant register the 
device to the specific service(s) it will be used to authenticate with. According to “How 
FIDO Works- Standard Public Key Cryptography and User Privacy” [25], “authentication 
is done by the client [claimant] device proving possession of its private key to the service 
by signing a challenge sent by the service. The client’s [claimant’s] keys can be used only 
after they are unlocked locally on the device by the user” [25]. Figure 3 displays the current 
compatibility between these standards and several common web browsers. 
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Figure 3. FIDO Support by Web Browser. Source: [26]. 
a. CTAP-1 (FIDO U2F) 
CTAP-1, previously referred to as FIDO Universal Second Factor (U2F), is one 
proposed standard for providing the second factor of any MFA process wherein the first 
authenticator is the standard password. CTAP-1 is compatible with any relying party (RP) 
that supports this standard [24]. 
Figure 4 displays the process in which CTAP-1 conducts authentication, following 
registration of the device. First, a claimant inputs a username and password. Then the 
claimant plugs in a CTAP-1 USB device (or other approved devices) into the computer’s 
USB port. In “Emulating U2F Authenticator Devices” [27], the author explains, 
Then the service formulates a challenge towards the authenticator device 
containing a key handle and a challenge. The authenticator device signs the 
challenge with the key associated with the specified handle and returns the 
result to the service. The service can now check the signature and match the 
used certificate against its user database. In case of a match, the 
authentication succeeds [27]. 
The CTAP-1 standard requires a physical “test of user presence” [24], which detects and 
confirms the user physically has the device. It is also used to ensure “that a signature 
happens only with the user’s permission… [and] that malware cannot exercise the signature 
when the user is not present” [24]. 
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Figure 4. FIDO CTAP-1 Overview. Source: [28]. 
As of March 2020, the security company Yubico was the only vendor to receive 
FIPS 140-2 validation for their multi-protocol security key that supports CTAP-1. The 
validated security key meets AAL3 standards [29]. CTAP-1 devices use an X.509 
attestation certificate during registration. Attestation certificates, also known as attribute 
certificates (AC), are, as described by [20], certificates that are cryptographically bound to 
their respective (owner) claimant, and which include select claimant attributes that enable 
access-related decisions. These certificates can be used for access control. Additionally, 
[20] states “ACs may also be used in the context of data origin authentication service and 
a non-repudiation service. In these contexts, the attributes contained in the AC provide 
additional information about the signing entity” [20]. ACs do not, however, facilitate 
authentication, because ACs do not contain claimant public keys [20]. Non-certified 
devices without an attestation certificate can still be accepted if the relying party consents 
to it [24]. 
b. CTAP-2 (FIDO 2)/WebAuthn 
CTAP-2 is comprised of the FIDO Alliance’s newest collection of specifications to 
enhance a passwordless ecosystem. CTAP-2 supports the use of existing specifications, 
making it compatible with CTAP-1 and FIDO UAF. CTAP-2 allows the claimant to “easily 
authenticate to online services in both mobile and desktop environments” [30]. 
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This type of authentication mitigates the risk of replay attacks, phishing attacks, 
and the threat of password compromises. Authenticators are different with each website, 
and never leave the device on which they were installed. Additionally, the authenticators 
are never stored on a server [26]. CTAP-2 gives claimants the ability to use capabilities 
organic to their chosen/available device, or to use a FIDO security key. This provides a 
level of convenience to the claimants and allows them to choose what best satisfies their 
needs. In the CTAP-2 standard, the RP uses an X.509 certificate to verify attestation [31]. 
In concert with CTAP-2, the WebAuthn web application programming interface 
(API) enables the use of public key authentication, promoting a passwordless environment. 
In March 2019, the W3C recognized WebAuthn as an official web standard [32]. W3C 
develops “standards to ensure the long-term growth of the Web” [33]. 
Web Authentication, known as WebAuthn, is the API between the claimant and the 
RP. It is designed to grant claimants the ability to access internet accounts using a device 
of the claimants’ choice [32]. CTAP-2 leverages WebAuthn specifications to construct a 
strong authentication standard. According to the FIDO Alliance, “WebAuthn enables 
online services to use FIDO Authentication through a standard web API that can be built 
into browsers and related web platform infrastructure” [30]. The CTAP-2/WebAuthn 
architecture is illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. WebAuthn/CTAP Architecture. Source: [30]. 
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Further, WebAuthn allows for claimant credentials to be integrated into major web 
browsers enabling the credential management API to, “create and register a public key 
credential for a website, and authenticate to a website by proving possession of the 
corresponding private key” [34]. According to Brand [34], this will strengthen the notion 
of a passwordless ecosystem by facilitating the following: 
1. Low friction and phishing-resistant two-factor authentication (to be used 
in conjunction with a password) 
2. Passwordless, biometrics-based re-authorization 
3. Low friction and phishing-resistant 2FA without a password (to be used 
for passwordless accounts). [34] 
Leveraging WebAuthn will allow claimants to register a credential to the chosen 
website, and also enable a website to authenticate a claimant and secure proof that the 
correct claimant is being communicated with [34]. In “Web Authentication: What It Is and 
What It Means for Passwords [35], WebAuthn is based on the FIDO UAF standard. 
WebAuthn handles “registration and authentication to a web application. The credentials 
created through the WebAuthn API rely on strong cryptographic principles and asymmetric 
encryption” [35]. 
c. FIDO UAF 
According to FIDO Alliance [36], the FIDO Universal UAF is the standard that 
allows for password-less authentication, while still leveraging the ability to use MFA (i.e., 
a password is not one of the factors). FIDO UAF can work with CTAP-1, CTAP-2, or 
independently. FIDO UAF architecture is compatible with any RP that accepts the UAF 
standard. Once the UAF device (e.g., mobile phone or tablet) is registered, claimants will 
no longer need to use their password to authenticate to that service. Instead, the user will 
only need to authenticate to the local UAF device (i.e., the device in his/her presence and 
under his/her control) using one of the implemented non-password  authenticators. FIDO 
UAF supports multiple authenticators for MFA (e.g. PIN + biometric) [28]. FIDO UAF 
uses an X.509 attestation certificate during registration  [36]. Figure 6 depicts the FIDO 
UAF operation (assuming the device is already registered). 
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Figure 6. FIDO UAF Standard. Source: [28]. 
2. OpenID Connect/OAUTH 2.0 
Prior to the advent of OAuth, the only method to share information between 
applications was for the claimant to authenticate directly and independently to each 
application involved [37]. According to Hardt [38], OAuth 2.0 and OIDC share mutually 
beneficial features that enable the “brokering” of claimant authentication among multiple 
applications. This “brokering” is facilitated by establishing login sessions with profile 
information related to the claimant. OAuth 2.0 is the framework that OIDC rides on, and 
is another standard offering passwordless authentication with single sign-on (SSO) 
functionality across multiple applications [38]. 
a. OpenID Connect 
OIDC is becoming a widely used authentication standard. When an application, 
such as Facebook or Google+,  asks a claimant to authenticate utilizing an authenticator 
for a another application, the application is more than likely leveraging OIDC [39]. 
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OIDC can be described as “a thin layer that sits on top of OAuth 2.0 that adds login 
and profile information about the person who is logged in” [37]. The OIDC flow mirrors 
that of OAuth 2.0, which is described in Chapter IV.2.b; however, OIDC has two 
differences in the standard’s flow. The first difference occurs during the initial request; as 
OIDC requests a specific scope, which refers to which explicit permissions the client 
requested. The second difference occurs during the final exchange, when the client takes 
possession of both the access and ID tokens, which contains login information about the 
claimant [37]. 
b. OAUTH 2.0 
OAuth 2.0 is not an authentication standard. It is important to address in this 
research; however, because it is sometimes confused with being an authentication standard. 
We address the details of OAuth 2.0 because it is used in conjunction with OIDC, and is a 
framework used for authorization and allows other applications to gain access, although 
limited, to an http service [38]. Access can be granted “on behalf of a resource owner by 
orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and http service, or by 
allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf” [38]. The 
application is given a key that gives it specific permissions (scope) to access particular 
information on behalf of the claimant [37]. As noted by Hardt [38], this framework secured 
pre-existing issues that existed in the old client-server authentication model, to include: 
• Storing credentials, typically an authenticator, for future use, in the clear. 
• The requirement for servers to support authenticator approval, regardless 
of the known vulnerabilities inherent in certain authenticators. 
• Applications receiving more access than necessary, thus compromising the 
resource owners’ capacity to limit accesses to restricted resources. 
• Compromise of a third-party authenticator resulting in the compromise of 
all resources and data protected by that authenticator. [38] 
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The flow described in RFC 6749 between the resource owner, the resource server, 
the client, and the authorization server is as follows: 
• The client requests authorization from the resource owner. The 
authorization request can be made directly to the resource owner (as 
shown), or preferably indirectly via the authorization server as an 
intermediary. 
• The client receives an authorization grant, which is a credential 
representing the resource owner’s authorization, expressed using one of 
four grant types defined in this specification or using an extension grant 
type. The authorization grant type depends on the method used by the 
client to request authorization and the types supported by the 
authorization server. 
• The client requests an access token by authenticating with the 
authorization server and presenting the authorization grant. 
• The authorization server authenticates the client and validates the 
authorization grant, and if valid, issues an access token. 
• The client requests the protected resource from the resource server and 
authenticates by presenting the access token. 




As discussed in Chapter III.A.3, the CAC/PKI authentication standard is the current 
PKI-based authentication standard for the U.S. Department of Defense. On December 7, 
2018, the DOD released a memorandum titled “Modernizing the Common Access Card—
Streamlining Identity and Improving Operational Interoperability” [12]. According to the 
“DOD Cybersecurity Discipline Implementation Plan” [12], the memo was in response to 
the DOD’s acknowledgement that it lacked the common PKI standards used by the rest of 
the Federal Government. The then current practices had resulted in poor interoperability 
between DOD and other government agencies (OGAs). The memo directs the DOD to 
align its use of the CAC with the Federal PIV-Auth certificate [40]. The memo outlines the 
following methods to accomplish this process: 
• Secure information exchange with DOD and OGAs by standardizing 
protocols and reducing inefficiencies. 
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• Use a standard PKI authenticator to improve cybersecurity and streamline 
configuration and change management. 
• Reduce costs with maintaining legacy authentication infrastructure. 
• Support commercial products that are HSPD-12 PIV/PKI compliant. [40] 
Modernizing the CAC will decrease the number of certificates on a CAC from four 
to three. The current CAC PKI X.509 certificates are DOD identity, DOD PIV 
Authentication, DOD e-mail signing, and DOD e-mail encryption. As stated by 
“Modernizing the Common Access Card - Streamlining Identity and Improving 
Operational Interoperability”  [41], following this conversion, the DOD “identity 
certificate will be removed and the e-mail signing certificate will no longer support client 
authentication,” (e.g., secure logon to CAC-enabled services). 
B. AUTHENTICATION PRODUCTS/VENDORS 
From our research, we chose these four products because they had strong MFA 
standards:  RSA, CyberArk, Yubico, and Okta. 
1. RSA 
RSA offers an MFA product called SecurID Access. This product is compatible 
with authentication for information technology (IT) devices in one’s local (on premises) 
environment, as well as authentication among IT devices interacting with a cloud 
infrastructure environment. This product can support: “mobile push authentication, 
biometrics (fingerprint, eye print), short messaging service (SMS), voice, e-mail, risk-
based, FIDO, proximity-based authentication and soft tokens, and, … hardware tokens”  
[42]. SecurID offers options for both hardware and software tokens and can be deployed 
locally, in the cloud, or part of a hybrid environment [42]. 
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2. Cyber Ark 
In March 2016, the CyberArk privileged account security solution became the only 
privileged account solution on the  U.S. Department of Defense Information Network 
(DODIN) Unified Capabilities Approved Products List (UC APL) [43]. 
CyberArk advertises itself as a security provider that offers the industry’s most 
comprehensive answer, “for protecting, controlling, and monitoring privileged access across 
on-premises, cloud, and hybrid infrastructure” [44]. CyberArk offers a multitude of products 
from privileged access solutions to cloud services, and application and endpoint management. 
Product experts from CyberArk will survey, employ, and provide management of programs 
to maximize what the overall security posture should be [45]. 
CyberArk’s privileged access security solution, formerly known as “privileged 
account security solution,” attempts to protect privileged accounts. According to a white paper 
“Privileged Account Security Solutions: A Competitive Review” [46], a review conducted by 
IDG Strategic Marketing Services and CyberArk, states that 80% of security breaches 
involved a compromised privileged account. The white paper uses the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) and Bangladesh Bank breaches as examples of how an administrator 
account was compromised, allowing hackers to obtain access to privileged accounts [46]. 
The CyberArk privileged access security solution is currently deployed to “multiple 
Department of Defense customers and 130+ installations across the U.S. federal government” 
[47]. The security solution is FIPS 140-2 validated and can support AES-256 and RSA-2048 
encryption algorithms. It can accept many forms of authentication to include: password, RSA 
SecurID, PKI, and smart cards. It also can support a large number of technologies, to include, 
network devices, databases, security appliances, cloud environments, directories, and 
applications; among many others [44]. 
3. Yubico 
Yubico is a company that develops physical MFA devices that can be implemented 
with several different authentication standards that were discussed in Section B of this chapter. 
This research focuses on the “YubiKey FIPS Series” devices because they are the only 
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security devices that are FIPS 140-2 validated with an overall rating of Level 2, and a physical 
security rating of Level 3. These devices meet AAL3 standards [48]. 
Though the series includes four versions of MFA devices, there is no operationally-
relevant distinction beyond which USB type is used. The series of devices include two of 
which are USB-A and two of which are USB-C. All four of these devices have the same 
functionality with the following standards supported:  “FIDO U2F, smart card (PIV), 
YUBICO OTP, OpenPGP, OATH-TOTP, OATH-HOTP, and Challenge-Response” [48]. 
The supported cryptographic algorithms are: “RSA 2048, ECC p256, ECC p384” [48]. 
YubiKeys use hardware to protect these cryptographic devices. 
4. Okta 
Okta offers “Workforce Identity” products to include “Adaptive MFA.” Okta states 
the “Adaptive MFA” will secure applications and VPNs [49]. Figure 7 displays the supporting 
authenticators that Okta’s “Adaptive MFA” can support. Adaptive MFA can also enable 
policies to mediate access based on location, device, and network context. Okta states that 
their infrastructure has achieved certifications that include FedRamp ATO (approval to 
operate) and FIPS 140-2 validation; and that they support PIV/CAC authentication [50]. 
FedRamp is a program run by the government which is intended to provide “a standardized 
approach to security assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring for cloud products 
and services” [51]. 
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Figure 7. Okta Adaptive MFA Supported Standards. Source: [52]. 
C. AUTHENTICATION METHODS COMPARISON 
Table 3 was created to compare the different methods discussed in Section A of 
this chapter by ranking them based on a list of weighted criteria. The table utilizes weighted 
technical and environmental attributes that are key considerations when dealing with the 
DoN authentication ecosystem. A Weighted Objectives Method [53],  was used to 
determine which digital authentication method would be the best fit for the DoN to 
modernize its current authentication practices. 
The attributes in Tables 3 and 4 were selected based on our research of the NIST 
800-63 Series and FIPS 140-2; and these attributes were determined to be the most relevant 
for consideration by DoN decision-makers. Table 3 is used to determine the most secure 
authentication method, with no direct consideration given to likely DoN usability issues. 
Effectively then, this table ignores the denominator (investment) in the well-known return 
on investment relationship (ROI), and concerns itself only with security strength (return). 
Table 4 reproduces Table 3, but adds four usability considerations which are negatively 
weighted (-1) to “penalize” any method that does not satisfy the usability attribute listed. 
These usability columns provide a means to tabulate added/required infrastructure 
investments that may alter the scoring of our candidate authentication methods. We deemed 
this to be important as it informs security decision makers who are applying a risk 
management (cost vs. benefit) approach to such investments. We weighted our security 
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attributes with integer values ranging from 0 to 3. A weight of 0 was included for instances 
where a range of weights were possible for a given attribute, but for which a given method 
did not satisfy even the lowest (weight of 1) requirement for the attribute. A fixed weight 
of 1 was given to attributes that we determined are important for secure authentication, but 
are not required by the NIST 800-63 series. A fixed weight of 2 was given to attributes that 
are mentioned in the 800-63 series, but not required to achieve AAL3. Finally, a fixed 
weight of 3 was given to attributes that are required by the NIST 800-63 series to achieve 
AAL3. The following bullets list the attributes, show the weights, in parentheses, that were 
assigned, and include a brief rationale for the weight chosen for each: 
• Passwordless (1): While this attribute is good to have due to the 
weaknesses inherent to passwords; it is not required by [3]. 
• Asymmetric Keys (3): This attribute is ascribed to methods that utilize 
public and private keys, “which are used to perform complementary 
operations such as encryption and decryption or signature verification and 
generation” [3]. 
• MFA (3)—To achieve AAL3, NIST 800-63B [6], requires MFA. 
• FIPS 140-2 Verification (0-3)— To remain consistent with the NIST SP 
800-63B we labeled this attribute FIPS 140-2 Verification. As we 
discussed in Chapter II.B, we believe it is “validation.”  This attribute was 
weighted 0-3. A weight of 0 indicates the authentication method does not 
have FIPS 140-2 validation. The authentication method was given a 
weight of 1 if it had the appropriate FIPS 140-2 validation to achieve 
AAL1. A weight of 2 was assigned if it had the appropriate FIPS 140-2 
validation to achieve AAL2. Finally, a weight of 3 was given if the 
appropriate FIPS 140-2 validation to achieve AAL3. 
• Physical Authenticator (3): AAL3 requires proof of possession of a key 
(secret) and a cryptographic protocol. At this level, a hardware-based 
(physical) authenticator must be used [6]. 
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• Authenticator Recovery Notification to User (2): NIST 800-63B [6], 
references that poorly implemented authentication recovery is a weak 
point owing to its vulnerability to social engineering attacks. To thwart 
such attacks, a notification to the user of any attempt to recover an 
authenticator can inform the user of malicious activity. 
• Provides an Attestation Certificate (2): NIST 800-63B [6], states that 
“attestation information MAY be used as part of a verifier’s risk-based 
authentication decision.” 
• Phishing Resistant (2): An authentication method offering  phishing 
resistance with, “approved cryptographic algorithms shall be used,” when 
it is necessary [6]. The implementation will establish safeguards against 
RP impersonation, adding another level of security against malicious 
actors. 
• Implements Traditional PKI (0-2): The PKI model has been used for years 
within the DoN and has been proven to be a safe and viable attribute for 
more secure authentication. Two key characteristics of the PKI model are 
that certification of subscribers’ public keys is centralized to a certification 
authority (CA), and the subscribers have their true identities vetted during 
the enrollment phase of their digital certificates’ life-cycle. A weight of 0 
was given if neither of these 2 aspects were met. A weight of 1 was given 
if only 1 of these aspects was met. A weight of 2 was given if both of 
these aspects were met. 
Although not specifically referenced in NIST 800-63B [6], we included four 
usability attributes in our analysis because this information helps to ground our DoN 
recommendations in Chapter V. We used the information provided in Chapter II.F from 
Table 2 to determine the attributes of usability that we consider the most important in a 
DoN infrastructure. The identified attributes were deemed important based on the research 
that we conducted to support and discuss Chapters I-IV, in addition to our experiences 
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working in many different DoN environments. The NIST SP800-63B states that the goal 
of authentication usability is “to minimize user burden and authentication friction (e.g., the 
number of times a user has to authenticate, the steps involved, and the amount of 
information he or she has to track” [6]. The usability attributes that were identified will 
support the NIST definition of authentication usability. The following bullets reference 
each usability attribute and include a brief description of why they are important to the 
current DoN infrastructure: 
• Compatibility with Cloud Based Systems: As the DoN moves towards 
migrating to cloud-based applications, authentication methods need to 
meet compatibility requirements for successful implementation. 
• Authenticator Availability: Authentication methods that require either a 
mobile device, NFC, Bluetooth, or physical key for authenticating a 
claimant were penalized considering there are many work environments 
wherein DoN employees will not be authorized to use these technologies. 
• Location / Availability of Direct Computer Interface (e.g. USB port): 
Several authentication methods require a connection to a USB port. It is 
imperative that a claimant has the ability to utilize these ports for 
authentication. 
• Interoperability with Legacy Systems: Due to the reliance and use of older 
legacy systems in the DoN, interoperability between legacy systems is of 
the utmost importance. Authentication methods need to be compatible for 
the security and operation of legacy systems. 
Following the assignment of weighted attributes, a total was calculated for each 
method, with a maximum possible weighted total of 21 for both Table 3 and Table 4. 
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Table 3. Security Attributes of Methods 
 
* If properly set up MFA prior to lost device; else these points should be subtracted from the total 
shown. 
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Table 4. Security Attributes of Methods with DoN Usability “Penalties” 
Considered 
 




V. IMPROVING U.S. NAVY DIGITAL AUTHENTICATION 
Secure operations in an increasingly digitized and online environment is something 
that impacts virtually every aspect of the DoN’s ability to accomplish its mission. 
Controlled access to digital resources lies at the heart of preventive security controls, and 
audited (user and program) system-level events lie at the heart of accountability (and 
related investigative) security controls. Given that authentication is a core enabler for both 
of these security control types, this chapter utilizes the analysis used to build Tables 3 and 
4 in Chapter IV.C, to formulate recommendations for modernizing the DoN’s current 
authentication methods. 
A. CURRENT DON AUTHENTICATION ENVIRONMENT 
As addressed in Chapter III.B, the adopted standard currently being utilized by the 
DoN is the CAC model. Also, Chapter III.B references the documents governing the 
employment and regulations for effective CAC integration. For perspective, this section 
will address current authentication processes used by the DoN (i.e., the status quo), in order 
to compare them to recommended improvements. 
1. Distribution of CAC to DoN Personnel 
CAC distribution occurs immediately upon either volunteering for active duty/
reserve military service, accepting employment as a DOD civilian, or for those fulfilling 
DOD eligible contracts. As stated in DOD Instruction 1000.13, “the CAC, a form of DOD 
ID card, shall serve as the PIV card for DOD implementation of HSPD—12” [54]. 
Effective CAC distribution will be accomplished by complying with the following criteria: 
• Issued based on sound criteria for verifying an individual employee’s 
identity 
• Strongly resistant to identity fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and 
terrorist exploitation 
• Can be rapidly authenticated electronically 
• Issued only by providers whose reliability has been established by an 
official accreditation process. [2] 
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PKI certificates are issued onto CACs, allowing personnel to access DOD-specific 
websites and digitally sign and encrypt electronic correspondence. Per the DOD X.509 
Certificate Policy, PKI certificates will be distributed to the following claimants who have 
a legitimate need: 
• DOD uniformed and civilian personnel, and eligible contractors 
• Executive department and agency personnel, and eligible contractors 
• State governments 
• Foreign government and foreign organization personnel, and eligible 
contractors. [14] 
For those entities that do not have access to DOD approved credentials, there are 
External Certification Authority (ECA) PKI certificates [55]. These certificates will 
authorize commercial partners to establish secure means of communication with DOD 
agencies. 
2. DON Instructions Governing Present Authentication Policies 
The governing documents that guide the DoN with its governance of authentication 
policies and procedures are: 
• SECNAV INSTRUCTION 3052.2: CYBER POLICY AND 
ADMINISTRATION WITHIN THE DON 
• SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5239.3C: DON CYBERSECURITY POLICY 
• OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5239.1D: USN CYBERSECURITY 
PROGRAM 
These documents all refer to the overarching DOD instructions discussed in 
Chapter III.B. Those instructions inform DOD managers regarding how to obtain and 
maintain interoperability between each branch of the military and partnering agencies, as 
well as interoperability between legacy systems. The importance of maintaining a robust 
cybersecurity posture is expounded in each of these documents. The overarching emphasis 
in the documents is perhaps best expressed in the “US Navy Cybersecurity Program” [56] 
as the: 
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prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration of computers, 
electronic communications systems, electronic communications services, 
wired communication, and electronic communication, including 
information contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. [56] 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCED DON-WIDE 
AUTHENTICATION 
The attributes of the different authentication methods from Table 3 and Table 4 
were used to select the recommendations. These weighted tables represent the foundation 
of our overall recommendations to enhance the DoN authentication environment. The 
results gleaned from Table 4 enabled us to identify four Tiers of authentication methods 
and the products that are utilized to implement them. The identified Tiers and their 
corresponding methods are: 1) CAC, 2) FIDO2, 3) 2FA (password and device), and 4) 
password-only. According to Table 3, CAC received the highest point total, signifying it 
as the most secure authentication method. When adding usability attributes, as displayed 
in Table 4; however, FIDO2 took the lead position among the contending methods. The 
aforementioned Tiers were organized based on the order of the authentication security 
provided (i.e., 1 provides the most, 4 the least). Given that a risk management approach is 
prudent here, the four tiers enumerated provide DoN cybersecurity decision-makers with 
options that provide the necessary—risk vs cost—flexibility. 
As discussed in Chapter II.B, when PII or personal information characterizes the 
information for which authentication is required, AAL2 should be used [6]. AAL2 
requirements are met in Tiers 1 through 3. According to DODI 8520.03 [7], “information 
that could adversely affect DOD mission interests and would have a moderate or high 
impact on the efficacy of DOD missions if the information were compromised,” would 
require, at a minimum, MFA (also provided by Tiers 1 through 3). Examples of this type 
of information are personnel information, logistics, or finance [7]. Furthermore,  when 
critical information that could result in “severe mission capability degradation, major 
damage to DOD information based resources, or a risk of serious injury or death to 
personnel, but that has not been specifically authorized to be classified,” at a minimum, 
PKI-based authentication (provided by Tiers 1 and 2) is required [7]. On DOD networks, 
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password-only authentication (Tier 4) is only approved when the “Sensitivity Level” of the 
information “would have a low or moderate adverse impact on the efficacy of DOD 
missions or the reputation of the DOD if the information were compromised” [7]. 
It should be noted here that our research was initially scoped to preclude the identity 
vetting aspect of the full authentication life-cycle (see Section I.A.1). This was decided 
owing to our interest in focusing more narrowly on the authentication processes that occur 
post-enrollment; that is, those processes directly related to a claimant proving possession 
of an already registered secret or biometric. It later became evident; however, that some 
degree of consideration was warranted in this regard, specifically as it pertained to 
authentication methods that were designed to offer anonymity as an option (e.g., FIDO2). 
This consideration of identity vetting is effectively captured in the Table 3 and Table 4 
security attribute labeled: “Implements Traditional PKI.” This attribute was described in 
Section III.C. Given that DoN’s most risk averse environments are unlikely to support any 
degree of anonymity (barring under-cover work), this attribute was largely at the heart of 
the criteria used to discriminate our Tier 1 (most secure) and Tier 2 (second most secure 
but more widely supportable) recommendation choices. 
Our recommendations stem from the results of the combined security and usability 
attributes listed in Table 4; all of which are detailed next. 
1. Tier-1 (CAC) 
CAC achieves AAL3. The CAC architecture is the current authentication method 
used by the DoN. For reference, Chapter III details how CAC is implemented. 
a. Strengths 
This Tier does not require the DoN to incur any additional developmental costs, 
given this architecture is currently implemented. Furthermore, the DoN will not have to 
provide any additional training to IT personnel. In contrast to other tiers, the CAC can be 
used in all work environments. 
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b. Challenges 
Not every DoN employee is eligible for a CAC [57]. As a result, they will have to 
rely on less secure authentication methods when accessing a government system. To 
overcome this challenge, the DoN could consider changing this policy, thus allowing more 
employees to be eligible to receive CACs. 
According to the FIDO Alliance [57], CAC is not easily integrated with legacy 
systems that do not have CAC infrastructure established. Furthermore, as the DoN moves 
to more cloud based applications, many of these applications do not support CAC/PKI [57]. 
These are the very usability factors that favor a 2nd Tier option that, even though not 
matching the security strength of the CAC method, still meets the AAL3 standard while 
also being more interoperable in more environments than the CAC. 
2. Tier-2 (FIDO2) 
FIDO2 standards achieve AAL3. Following our research and the results from Table 
3, we observed that FIDO2 is not as secure as CAC authentication, but it makes PKI-based 
authentication more widely available. FIDO2 can leverage other secure authentication 
standards, such as the CAC, which may already be integrated within existing DoN 
infrastructure. Incorporating FIDO2 into the current DoN infrastructure would provide 
additional security in all operational instances that are currently using weaker methods (i.e., 
those less than AAL3, such as a password only method). According to the FIDO Alliance 
[57], “FIDO is not a replacement for PKI but rather complements it, enabling greater 
number of users and applications to be protected using asymmetric encryption.” 
a. Strengths 
According to “NIST 800-63 Guidance and FIDO Authentication” [58], the FIDO2 
authentication standards meet NIST AAL3. These standards protect claimants from having 
their authenticators re-used, owing to the fact that their authenticators never leave the 
device. Additionally, FIDO2 standards prevent phishing attacks because authenticators 
cannot be shared [58]. FIDO2 standards are also relatively easy to deploy, as they do not 
require middleware. 
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The General Services Administration’s (GSA) website, login.gov, provides an 
excellent example of how FIDO2 is utilized in a government system [59]. Prior to GSA 
implementing FIDO2, GSA evaluated several different authentication standards to 
determine how these standards integrated with their priorities: security, cost, and 
compliance [59]. Ultimately, GSA chose FIDO2 because of its phishing resistance 
(security), its relatively low cost (a usability factor), and its compliance with NIST SP 
800-63B (compliance) [59]. 
Using FIDO2, employees would be able to access government systems with a FIDO 
security key, or with their own devices, such as cell phones, if they are FIDO-compatible. 
According to Corum [60], PIV credentials “are not issued to all individuals accessing 
agency networks and services, so this could prove a cost effective, rapid approach to 
authenticating these individuals.” 
b. Challenges 
These standards require a FIDO-compliant device, such as a mobile phone, or a 
FIDO security key. Many environments in the DoN do not permit mobile devices in 
workspaces. For those situations, a FIDO security key would be necessary. However, the 
Yubico FIPS keys, as discussed in Chapter IV.B.3, are relatively expensive to implement, 
ranging in price from $46 to $69 each  [48]. 
Further, in order to implement FIDO2, the DoN will have to develop code that 
enables WebAuthn to function. According to FIDO Alliance [59], GSA was able to develop 
the code in two weeks with a team of three persons. The team was able to create the code 
quickly because the code is open-source on GitHub, which offers the developers a solid 
starting point. As a result, this challenge is deemed relatively easy to overcome. 
3. Tier-3 (2FA (Password + Device)) 
Two Factor Authentication achieves AAL2. 
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a. Strengths 
2FA is a less expensive option than is employing either of the methods enumerated 
for Tiers 1 and 2. This is related to the fact that DoN employees can likely utilize their own 
personal devices as the second factor in those less security stringent environments where 
personal devices are permitted. 
b. Challenges 
Similar to one of the challenges with FIDO2, many work environments do not 
authorize personal devices in the workplace. Therefore, 2FA would be hard to implement 
in these environments given that e-mail (a popular method of delivering the 2nd factor to 
claimants using their work devices), is not authorized as an out-of-band authentication 
method for 2FA [6]. 
2FA also has vulnerabilities that make it more susceptible to phishing and account 
recovery attacks. In some instances, account recovery bypasses the second authentication 
factor by resetting the password of an account, which can be exploited by attackers. 
Attackers have successfully used this method to gain access to accounts that had 2FA 
enabled [61]. For example, in 2011, a Chinese, state-sponsored hacking group successfully 
bypassed RSA’s SecurID 2FA system [62]. RSA’s Executive Chairman wrote, 
While at this time we are confident that the information extracted does not 
enable a successful direct attack on any of our RSA SecurID customers, this 
information could potentially be used to reduce the effectiveness of a 
current two-factor authentication implementation as part of a broader attack 
[63]. 
4. Tier-4 (PW only) 
Password only authentication achieves AAL1. 
a. Strengths 
Password-only authentication incurs no additional overhead costs, which is similar 
to our Tier 3 recommendation. This method of authentication also has widespread support 
throughout the authentication ecosystem. 
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b. Challenges 
Where the DoN currently supports password-only authentication, it continues to 
subjugate itself to the list of vulnerabilities described in Chapter II.E. These inherent risks 
can be ameliorated somewhat with complex password policies. 
C. SUMMARY 
In the process of conducting research on the various digital authentication methods, 
highlighting security attributes, and examining usability attributes within the existing DoN 
infrastructure, this chapter focused on choosing the most suitable options. The 
recommended tiers were developed from the results gleaned from Table 3 and Table 4. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
This thesis examined the current digital authentication standards currently 
employed by the DoN, analyzed the governing documents and instructions that provide 
direction and performed an in-depth examination into more modern options available for 
operational use. It also analyzed the methods and their usability within the DoN’s 
authentication ecosystem. 
A. SUMMARY 
By analyzing a relatively large sample of modern digital authentication standards, 
this thesis offered recommendations to improve the overall security strength of the Navy’s 
currently deployed digital authentication ecosystem. This effort revolved around four main 
areas of inquiry: 1) the clarification of terminology used in the subject of I&A, 2) an 
assessment of protocols and techniques (collectively “methods”) available to conduct I&A, 
3) the identification of security and usability attributes useful for comparing I&A methods, 
and 4) understanding the competing methods sufficiently so as to be capable of assigning 
appropriate weights to each with regard to how well they satisfy our chosen comparison 
attributes. The security and usability attributes are presented in tabular form in Table 3 and 
Table 4, respectively. 
Given that security controls are largely driven by a risk management approach (i.e., 
the impact of a potential security control failure influences the security investment), we 
sought to present a tiered (range) of I&A methods to DoN managers. As such Tier 1 is 
considered the most secure, and thus most appropriate for high impact (or high risk) 
operations; and Tier 4 is considered the least secure (except for no I&A), and thus only 
appropriate for relatively low impact (or low risk) operations. In the final analysis, we 
articulated four Tiers as follows: Tier 1—CAC-based PKI method, Tier 2—FIDO2-based 
PKI method, Tier 3—2FA method, and Tier 4—password-only method. 
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1. Standardizing the Terminology 
One of the many challenges of conducting research on this topic was the wide-
ranging and not always standardized jargon that is used throughout the literature on this 
topic. This thesis required the delineation between, and explanation of, key terms used to 
describe different aspects of the modern authentication environment, so as to minimize 
possible confusion between key topics. 
Key terms established in Chapter I.C of this thesis for uniformity include the 
following: 
• Attribute—Specific information that correlates the claimant to a digital 
identity (e.g., name, agency name) 
• Authenticator—represents whatever is being presented by the claimant to 
satisfy the authentication criteria utilized by the verifier (e.g., password) 
• Authentication—the act of verifying a claimant’s preferred identity 
• Claimant—the entity that is claiming ownership of a registered persona, as 
(typically) represented by an identity (e.g., username) 
• Credential—that which binds an authenticator to a claimant (e.g., a 
claimant’s digital certificate containing the public key that corresponds 
with the authenticator private key) 
• Registrant—an entity that is in the process of having its persona validated 
(usually via corroboration with extant forms of identification) by various 
authorized criteria or processes (also referred to as enrollment) 
• Relying Party (RP)—the entity that has a security-related interest in the 
truthfulness of a claimant’s declaration of a particular identity, usually for 
purposes of access control or non-repudiation 
• Token—A digital object (e.g., a unique string of characters bound to a 
claimant for identity authentication, that will not be shared between 
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claimants) presented to a claimant that serves as proof verifiable by a 3rd 
party RP that the claimant has been authenticated by a verifier 
• Verifier— the entity in possession of previously registered authenticators 
associated with registered claimants (e.g., biometric or secret), which 
performs the authentication process 
• Identity— The claimant will be distinguished with the unique 
characterization provided by the CSP (e.g., john.doe3690) 
2. Methods That Were Considered and Why 
With the added complexity of navigating a dynamically and fluid environment in 
which identification and authentication are required, the research for choosing an 
authentication method was dictated by what would best fulfill the needs of the DoN’s 
efforts to modernize information security. 
Through review of the NIST 800-63-3 series, and online resources like the FIDO 
Alliance and W3C, authentication methods were selected on the basis of how secure they 
could be, and whether or not they could satisfy DOD security implementation standards. 
Other factors considered for inclusion were technological attributes that were interoperable 
with existing infrastructure, and the requirement for additional hardware or software 
prescribed by governing documents. The following authentication methods were identified 
and analyzed in Chapter IV.A to construct a sufficient recommendation for 
implementation: 
• CTAP-1 (FIDO U2F) 
• FIDO2 (CTAP-2/WEBAUTH) 






The basis for the continued research and analysis of the methods was determined, 
and tabulated as attributes in Tables 3 and 4. Further, these attributes were weighted in 
terms of their relative security strength and usability within the DoN. 
3. Primary Guidance for Evaluating the Contenders 
The guidance for evaluating authentication methods was dictated by factors 
mandated by several over-arching documents that included implementation guidance and 
technical requirements. The publications and resources cited throughout this thesis 
provided a baseline for the research, and a wealth of knowledge for determining whether 
or not each recommended option’s passwordless authentication ecosystem was viable. 
a. NIST 800-63 SERIES 
This series of instructions was written and disseminated to be the guiding principles 
to, “provide technical requirements for federal agencies implementing digital identity 
services” [3]. The following publications provide the guidance and requirements for what 
meets the DOD standard: 
• NIST 800-63-3—Digital Identity Guidelines 
• NIST 800-63A—Digital Identity Guidelines: Enrollment and 
Identity Proofing 
• NIST 800-63B—Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and 
Life cycle Management 
• NIST 800-63C—Digital Identity Guidelines: Federation and 
Assertions 
b. FIPS 140-2 
The FIPS 140-2 [9] was crucial to the research because it served as the guideline 
for the security requirements set forth by the NIST 800-63B. It articulates a standard that 
is required for use by Federal organizations when it is made evident that a “cryptographic-
based security system,” must be relied upon for the security for sensitive data [10]. 
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Also, FIPS 140-2 security level requirements for cryptographic modules were 
discussed in Chapter II.B, with Level 1 specifying the least security required of 
cryptographic modules, and Level 4 specifying the most. These levels played a relatively 
decisive role when assigning weight values to each standard that was considered in Chapter 
IV and described in detail in Chapter II.B. 
c. U.S. DOD X.509 Certificate Policy 
The X.509 Certificate Policy was used to outline the guidelines that would need to 
be considered for the implementation of a reliable PKI infrastructure. Additionally, this 
publication sets the guidelines for which equipment is authorized, and which guidelines a 
certification authority (CA) must adhere to for establishment and operation [14]. 
d. FIDO Alliance 
The FIDO Alliance is an open standard that aims at eliminating passwords, and 
providing MFA and 2FA environments [21]. Because the goal of the research was to 
improve and modernize the DoN’s current authentication methods, third party methods like 
FIDO’s CTAP-1 (FIDO U2F), CTAP-2 (FIDO2), and FIDO UAF became viable options 
when performing the analysis to formulate an impactful recommendation. 
e. W3C 
Similar to the FIDO Alliance, W3C is open platform that allows developers to share 
and make improvements to the overall health and growth of the web [64]. Information 
pertaining to standards like OIDC, OAuth 2.0, the WebAuthn authorization API, and other 
technologies associated with authentication can be easily researched here. 
4. Metrics of Comparison 
Two tables were established at the end of Chapter IV for the purpose of providing 
a high-level summary of the most applicable metrics (captured as attributes) useful for 
comparing each authentication method against the others. The security-related metrics 
chosen were: asymmetric keys, MFA, passwordless, FIPS 140 verification (MFA must 
meet Level 2 and single factor cryptographic devices must meet level 1), physical 
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authenticator, authenticator recovery notification to the user, phishing resistance, 
implements traditional PKI, and provides an attestation certificate. The usability metrics 
from the NIST 800-63B chosen were: authenticator availability, location availability of 
direct computer interface (e.g. USB port), compatibility with cloud-based systems, and 
interoperability with legacy systems [6]. 
Table 3 was used to tabulate methods with order based solely upon the desired 
security attributes of a digital authentication system. Issues related to DoN usability and 
the potential for additional costs related to upgrading infrastructure to support the methods 
were omitted. This was done to show the clear security winners when immediacy of 
implementation may be of lesser concern than security. This is useful for situations wherein 
DoN decision-makers may deem the risks associated with authentication failures to be so 
high, that budget increases are justified for mitigation. This follows well established risk 
management policy. 
Table 4 was used to tabulate Table 3 with DoN usability/cost “penalties” subtracted 
to account for likely usability challenges and added costs associated with implementing 
each of the methods being compared. These usability “penalties” affected the ordering of 
the top methods from Table 3. FIDO2 superseded CAC since it has usability attributes that 
are more compatible within the DoN infrastructure (e.g., compatibility with legacy and 
cloud-based systems). 
5. Ranking and Recommendations 
The results from Table 3 and Table 4 constituted the foundation of our 
recommendations to enhance the DoN authentication environment. CAC (Tier 1) was the 
strongest authentication method in Table 3 (most secure), and FIDO2 was the strongest 
method in Table 4 (usability). If these methods are not an option, this thesis recommends 
that 2FA (Tier 3) be implemented. Finally, password-only authentication (Tier 4) is 
recommended only when the aforementioned authentication methods are not available or 
cannot be integrated. 
According to DODI 8520.03 [7], Tiers 1, 2, or 3 would suffice if the information 
for which authentication is required “could adversely affect DOD mission interests and 
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would have a moderate or high impact on the efficacy of DOD missions if the information 
were compromised.”  Furthermore, only Tiers 1 or 2 would suffice if the information could 
result in “severe mission capability degradation, major damage to DOD information based 
resource, or a risk of serious injury or death to personnel” [7]. Finally, on DOD networks, 
Tier 4 is only approved when the information “would have a low or moderate adverse 
impact on the efficacy of DOD missions or the reputation of the DOD if the information 
were compromised” [7]. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
This thesis based its recommendations on one aspect of the authentication life 
cycle: use of pre-established (via enrollment or registration) authenticators to prove the 
claimed identity. Future research is needed to determine if these recommendations are still 
the most secure options when implementing other aspects of authentication, such as the 
registration—also known as enrollment—or (authenticator) recovery/revocation processes. 
1. Concern with the Novelty of FIDO2 
Currently, the security concerns with FIDO2 are few and far between, but there is 
an issue if the authentication device associated with the claimant is lost. The possibility of 
exploitation of a  lost authentication device by a cyber actor is cause for concern. According 
to Steven Soneff, a product manager at Google, “The recovery mechanism is often the 
weakest link and where attackers will find their way in” [65]. 
PIV smart card security keys that support FIDO standards are a cause for concern 
as well. In the past there was a vulnerability in the firmware during RSA key generation 
which reduced,  “the strength of keys generated immediately after power-up by up to 10 
bytes for affected RSA keys” [66]. In this case, the vulnerability was discovered and 
addressed with a firmware update to inhibit the issues from becoming more widespread. 
Although chances of an attacker getting access to this information is slim, the vulnerability 
still remains and could prove to be very damaging. 
Another cause for concern is the rivalry between Android and IOS devices. The 
compatibility issues each platform has with the other could lead to the exclusion of large 
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numbers of mobile devices to be used as an authenticator. This is slowing down the public 
distribution of FIDO2 to the masses. Apple continues to implement proprietary security 
measures within their own environment instead of leveraging well-known technologies like 
FIDO authentication standards [65]. 
2. Further Research to Shore Up Vulnerabilities that May Exist 
FIDO2 is in its infancy, but just as with other security standards, there will be a 
concerted effort to exploit or break the protocol for nefarious means. Because of the 
backwards combability between FIDO2 and CTAP-1 (FIDO U2F), the possibility exists 
that any of the prior (weaker) generation’s vulnerabilities could be exploited by attackers 
seeking to compromise the newer generation. 
Although time consuming, investigative reverse engineering could reveal security 
vulnerabilities not previously found in these new protocols and standards. Vulnerabilities 
could exist in components used in initial releases that were discovered during product 
teardown, revealing attack vectors not previously seen by product developers. 
All of these factors must be accounted for when developers are engineering 
products used to provide reliable security for the safeguarding of services promoting 
identity and information management. The challenge of mitigating “all” vulnerabilities 
persisting in authentication methods and products, and anything requiring connectivity to 
the internet will remain an issue that will require security professionals to evolve and pivot 
when emerging threats present themselves. 
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